Wikileaking the Truth about American Unaccountability for Torture by Hajjar, Lisa
Societies Without Borders
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 3
2012
Wikileaking the Truth about American
Unaccountability for Torture
Lisa Hajjar
University of California—Santa Barbara
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cross Disciplinary Publications at Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Societies Without Borders by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hajjar, Lisa. 2012. "Wikileaking the Truth about American Unaccountability for Torture." Societies Without Borders 7 (2): 192-225.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol7/iss2/3
L. Hajjar/Societies Without Borders 7:2 (2012) 192-225 
~192~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
Wikileaking the Truth about American                        
Unaccountability for Torture  
 
Lisa Hajjar 
University of California—Santa Barbara 
 
Received September 2011; Accepted March 2012 
______________________________________________________ 
  
Abstract.  
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are international offenses and                       
perpetrators can be prosecuted abroad if accountability is not pursued at home. The 
US torture policy, instituted by the Bush administration in the context of the “war on 
terror” presents a contemporary example of liability for gross crimes under                        
international law. For this reason, classification and secrecy have functioned in              
tandem as a shield to block public knowledge about prosecutable offenses. Keeping 
such information secret and publicizing deceptive official accounts that contradict the 
truth are essential to propaganda strategies to sustain American support or apathy 
about the country’s multiple current wars. Although a great deal of information and 
evidence has come to light about the US torture policy, there has been no thorough 
domestic investigation up the chain of command, no full public disclosure, and no 
effort to prosecute its intellectual authors in US courts. The classified diplomatic      
cables allegedly provided to Wikileaks by Bradley Manning have revealed one critical 
way in which this unaccountability has been enforced. This article addresses four 
issues: First, a consideration of the importance of accountability for torture and other 
gross violations of international law; second, a summary of efforts to hold US officials 
accused of torture-related offenses accountable in European courts; third, an                       
examination of several leaked diplomatic cables that expose the lengths to which both 
the Bush and Obama administrations have gone to derail these foreign criminal             
investigations in Germany and Spain; and fourth, the unexpected consequences that 
leaks played in unleashing anti-authoritarian uprisings in the Arab world and the  
possibilities of future accountability.  
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The right not to be tortured is the most universal and,                  
arguably, the most important right that human beings have because it 
applies to all people everywhere under all circumstances, including in 
the context of war and armed conflict, and it is absolutely non-
derogable (Hajjar 2009a). The right not to be tortured is a negative 
right, constituted through the prohibition of practices that meet the 
1
Hajjar: Wikileaking the Truth about American Unaccountability for Torture
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012
L. Hajjar/Societies Without Borders 7:2 (2012) 192-225 
~193~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
legal definition of torture, namely those acts of omission or                       
commission that purposefully cause severe physical harm and/or 
mental suffering to people who are in custody but have not been 
found guilty of any crime. (The prohibition excludes the harms arising 
from lawful, court-ordered punishments regardless of their brutality.) 
Thus, the legal prohibition of torture imposes a sharp limit on the 
rights of states by depriving state agents and anyone acting under the 
color of law (e.g., government-hired contractors) of any lawful excuse 
to engage in or abet such prohibited practices.  
Torture is in the same negative-right company with genocide 
and war crimes. Together, these negative rights aptly have been 
termed the “harder human rights” (Hagan, Schoenfeld and Palloni 
2006). What distinguishes torture from violations of other harder   
human rights is the custodial relationship. The clarity of the custodial 
relationship (i.e., people are either in custody or they are not) and the 
extreme power imbalance between custodians and prisoners                       
distinguishes the harms of torture from the conditions in which               
violations of the other harder human rights occur. At least in theory, 
people who are vulnerable to non-custodial violations can fight back, 
flee or surrender. Those self-preservation options are not available to 
people in custody. 
The prohibition and criminality of torture is customary                
international law, which creates legal obligations to prosecute people 
accused of perpetrating or abetting this gross crime. When those who 
are accused of engaging in torture are not prosecuted and punished, 
their immunity or impunity makes a mockery of the law itself (see  
Human Rights Watch 2011). Such mockery characterizes post-9/11 
decisions by US officials in the Bush administration to institute                
policies that disregarded the legal prohibition of torture in the                   
interrogation and detention of suspects captured in the “war on                
terror,” and was compounded by disregarded obligations under                
federal and international law to pursue accountability, which extended 
to the next administration (Hajjar 2009b). President Obama has                   
justified this failure with the facile mantra of “looking forward, not 
backward.” However, domestic unaccountability does not absolve 
perpetrators and abettors because torture is a crime that attaches             
universal jurisdiction, which means that perpetrators can be                      
prosecuted in foreign national court systems if they are not prosecuted 
2
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in the country with jurisdiction over the accused (active personality 
jurisdiction) or the country where the crime occurred (passive                 
personality jurisdiction).  
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is premised on the      
principle that some crimes under international law—including                
torture—are so grave that their perpetrators are “enemies of all                
mankind” (hostis humani generis) and, therefore, that all countries have 
an interest in enforcing the law against them. When torture occurs in 
the context of war, as was the case in the US torture policy, it                      
constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 
minimum violations of Common Article 3, which pertains to “non-
international” (i.e., not state-to-state) wars. Common Article 3                
prohibits and criminalizes torture, cruel treatment, and “outrages on 
human dignity” of detained people who do not qualify for prisoner-of
-war status. Such violations are war crimes, which attach a principle of 
accountability similar to universal jurisdiction because the Geneva 
Conventions are customary international law and impose an explicit 
duty on every state party—which, since the turn of the twenty-first 
century, includes every state in the world—to seek extradition of               
accused war criminals or at least to avail its courts for prosecution (aut 
dedere aut judicare).  
The vast majority of war crimes committed in conflicts 
around the world go unpunished. Torture, for reasons noted above 
(i.e., the non-derogable nature of the prohibition and the clarity of the 
custodial relationship), lends itself more readily to the possibility of 
prosecution than other types of war crimes. The use of excessive force 
or the deliberate targeting of civilians are no less illegal but impose 
greater challenges to prosecution because the so-called “fog of war” 
makes it more difficult to ascertain and prove that those ordering or 
executing a military operation in which civilians are killed did so              
intentionally. Unintentional killing of civilians in a legitimate military 
operation targeting combatants is not a war crime; rather, it bears the 
cold label “collateral damage.” The use of indiscriminate weaponry 
(e.g., landmines, chemical weapons), which is a policy decision, is even 
harder to penalize in practice because the issue of intent lies far up the 
chain-of-command.  
The subject of this article is the prosecutability of torture. It 
begins by locating analysis of accountability for gross crimes in the 
3
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context of the jurisprudence of violence. Then it focuses on efforts to 
enforce international criminal law by holding US officials and state 
agents accountable for torture and related offenses (kidnapping and 
disappearance) perpetrated in the context of the “war on terror” in 
foreign national court systems (primarily Germany and Spain). The 
main focus, however, is on the political counter-efforts to thwart such 
accountability. Information about the latter has entered the public 
domain as a result of leaked, classified US State Department cables 
published by the anti-secrecy organization Wikileaks.  
 
APPLYING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF VIOLENCE TO 
CRIMES OF STATE 
 The practice of human rights and much of the scholarship 
about that practice focuses explicitly or implicitly on “the gap                   
problem,” namely how to close the gap between laws in the books 
that establish the right to rights, and law in action to enforce those 
rights, including sanctions for violations. Because violations of the 
harder human rights are gross crimes, closing the gap necessitates a 
prosecutorial approach to law enforcement. Redressing violations of 
other types of human rights that are not criminalized require other 
kinds of enforcement strategies (e.g., reporting and advocacy).  
In regard to the enforcement of the harder human rights, 
scholarship and activism should incorporate a greater appreciation for 
the violence of law. The late Robert Cover (1995) has been credited 
for ushering in and laying the ground for a “jurisprudence of                   
violence” (Sarat 2001: 9; see Minow, Ryan & Sarat 1995). He begins 
his essay, “Violence and the Word,” with a suggestive and often cited 
observation: “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and 
death” (1995: 203). By acknowledging that law not only responds to 
but also metes out pain and death, Cover “achieved a crucial                      
conceptual breakthrough, penetrating a venerable intellectual deposit 
that [had] nearly succeeded in completely concealing law’s violence as 
violence” (Sarat and Kearns 2001: 53). While Cover has been 
acknowledged for his intellectual insights and moral commitments, he 
also has been criticized by some scholars as an “apologist for law’s 
violence” (Sarat and Kearns 2001:50), and for exhibiting a “general 
satisfaction with the asymmetry of power between punishers and     
punished” (Simon 2001: 25). Indeed, Cover impels such readings: “If I 
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have exhibited some sense of sympathy for the victims of this           
violence it is misleading. Very often the balance of terror in this regard 
is just as I would want it” (1995: 211). The “field of pain and death” 
to which Cover refers is the American criminal justice system in which 
law enforcement is shaped by enormous racial and class inequalities, 
and a voracious prison complex. Jonathan Simon writes: “For that 
reason we should not follow Cover’s premature effort to ‘make peace 
with violence’” (2001: 42). Like Simon, many progressives, including 
those whose intellectual and political commitments are devoted to the 
promotion and protection of rights, are fundamentally uncomfortable 
with violence, even legal violence, and wish to see themselves, their 
cause, and their goals as rejoinders to violence. But Cover was right: 
law is violent (in part), even if that violence is antiseptically termed 
“legitimate force.” 
Cover did not write about—or, arguably, envision—the                
prospects for law’s violence that have developed over the last two 
decades as a result of post-Cold War transformations in international 
criminal law enforcement institutions and mechanisms (Bass 2001; 
Bolton 2000; Bradley and Goldsmith 1997; Hajjar 2003; Hitchens 
2001; Kahn 2000; Koh 1997; Macedo 2001; Neier 1998; Robertson 
1998; Roht-Arriaza 2001, 2005). Those transformations have created a 
new category of potential “victims of this violence”: officials and 
agents of states, including powerful states, who are accused of                   
perpetrating gross crimes in the context of war and conflict. One                
important question, with both academic and practical implications, is 
whether prosecuting perpetrators of gross crimes has become or will 
come to be regarded as legally obligatory, with an attendant                      
diminishment of executive and military discretion.  
The state of international criminal law enforcement is in flux. 
There is an opportunity and, I would argue, a necessity for human 
rights scholars to weigh in on the merits of the prosecution of state 
agents and others accused of gross crimes. The cases arising from   
efforts to prosecute American perpetrators and abettors of torture in 
foreign courts, as reflected in the examples below, illuminates                
contemporary disagreements over how and where justice should be 
pursued, and who decides if justice has been done. But to even                
contemplate the issue of justice, information about crime and                   
criminality is a crucial ingredient. 
5
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LEAKS AND LIES 
 The first indication of the largest intelligence breach in US 
history appeared on April 10, 2010, when Wikileaks released a                    
classified US military video titled “Collateral Murder.” The footage 
shows an assault in Baghdad on July 12, 2007, shot from an Apache 
helicopter and accompanied by harrowing audio from a remote              
command center urging on the attackers with language better suited to 
a video game. The helicopter gunners shot up everything in the                  
vicinity and left eleven people dead, including a Reuters photographer, 
his driver, and a man who had stopped his van to try to rescue one of 
the wounded. The audio reveals someone laughing when an armored 
vehicle runs over one of the corpses. When soldiers arrived on the 
scene and discovered two badly wounded children in Good                         
Samaritan’s van, one can be heard saying: “Well, it's their fault                   
bringing their kids to a battle.”  
Why was this video classified? The answer—not a good 
one—is that might constitute material evidence of a war crime. At 
minimum it authoritatively refutes the Pentagon’s explanation that 
people on the ground had initiated the attack (see Fromkin 2010). The 
video shows that only one of the men mulling in the street had a gun 
slung from his shoulder and what was assumed to be a grenade 
launcher turned out to be the photographer’s telephoto lens.  
After the video when viral, a military intelligence analyst 
based in Baghdad named Pfc. Bradley Manning revealed himself to be 
the source to someone he met online named Adrian Lamo. According 
to their chat logs (Hansen 2011), Manning was very clear about why 
he leaked the video:  
 
well, it was forwarded to WL [Wikileaks] - and god 
knows what happens now - hopefully worldwide  
discussion, debates, and reforms - if not, than [sic] 
we're doomed - as a species - i will officially give up 
on the society we have if nothing happens - the                
reaction to the video gave me immense hope; CNN's 
iReport was overwhelmed; Twitter exploded - people 
who saw, knew there was something wrong . . . i 
want people to see the truth . . . regardless of who 
they are . . . because without information, you cannot 
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make informed decisions as a public. 
 
Manning tipped his hand in chats to Lamo that he had leaked 
other materials as well, for the same reason.  
 
hypothetical question: if you had free reign over   
classified networks for long periods of time… and 
you saw incredible things, awful things… things that 
belonged in the public domain, and not on some 
server stored in a dark room in Washington DC… 
what would you do?  
 
In July 2010, Wikileaks began releasing a trove of 90,000  
classified war reports from Afghanistan and Iraq. On November 28, 
the first batch of more than 250,000 State Department diplomatic 
cables started being published through a collaborative agreement           
between Wikileaks and major newspapers in several countries,                   
including the New York Times and the Guardian. (Through a series of 
mistakes, the diplomatic cables in their unredacted entirety became 
available in September 2011.) On April 24, 2011, Wikileaks published 
Defense Department reports about past and present prisoners at 
Guantánamo.  
After Lamo reported these chats to the FBI, Manning was 
arrested in May 2010 and transferred, via Kuwait, to the Marine brig 
at Quantico where he was held in solitary confinement for eight 
months and subjected to forced nudity and sensory overload. Juan 
Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, who investigated 
Manning’s treatment in pre-trial detention, issued a report that it               
constituted cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, and possibly 
torture (Pilkington 2012). Manning was transferred to Ft.                             
Leavenworth in April 2011. On February 24, 2012, he was arraigned 
on twenty-two charged offenses under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the draconian Espionage Act of 1917, including “aiding 
the enemy” (see Greenwald 2011). 
One would be hard pressed to identify how any actual                   
enemies of the US would gain military advantage from the “Collateral 
Murder” video or assessment reports of Guantánamo detainees. It is 
worth recalling that the names of those detainees who had been          
7
Hajjar: Wikileaking the Truth about American Unaccountability for Torture
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012
L. Hajjar/Societies Without Borders 7:2 (2012) 192-225 
~199~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
imprisoned since 2002 were classified until 2006, although that list was 
leaked in 2005 by a military lawyer, Matt Diaz, who opposed the                 
government’s refusal to provide this information to lawyers working 
on their behalf; Diaz was subsequently court-martialed (Horton 2007). 
The leakage of the diplomatic cables might be construed as a plausible 
threat if embarrassment were fatal.  
The leaking of classified information is a criminal offense. 
But the charge of aiding the enemy—and Manning is not the only 
leaker so charged by the Obama administration—is revealing of the 
current state of enforced secrecy and official deception in the US. The 
incriminating contents of the “Collateral Murder” video and some of 
the leaked documents suggest that the “enemy” is accountability for 
crimes of state. Classification and secrecy have functioned in tandem 
as a shield to block public knowledge about prosecutable offenses in 
the “war on terror.” Keeping such information secret and publicizing 
deceptive official accounts that contradict the truth are essential to 
propaganda strategies to sustain public support—or public apathy—
about the country’s multiple wars. The war on whistleblowers, to 
which the harsh treatment of Manning is an extreme example, is one 
means of preventing such information from getting out by deterring 
would-be leakers (see Greene 2011; Madar 2012; Mayer 2011).  
Wikileaks is by no means the only conduit for publicizing 
information about crimes of state in the context of the “war on               
terror.” Over the last decade, investigative journalists like Dana Priest, 
Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, James Risen, Charlie Savage, and Jeremy 
Scahill have drawn on insider sources and leaked materials to publish 
exposés about torture and extraordinary rendition, secret prisons,   
warrantless spying on citizens, assassination operations, and other    
illegal policies and practices. The most significant propaganda-
undermining event in the “war on terror” occurred on April 28, 2004, 
when the leaked (albeit not classified) Abu Ghraib photos were      
broadcast on CBS, and Hersh (2004) published an article in The New 
Yorker about a leaked classified investigative report by Maj. Gen.            
Antonio Taguba which concluded that prisoner abuse in Iraq was 
“wanton” and “systematic.”  
In response to the Abu Ghraib scandal, at first Bush                     
administration officials employed the tactic of denial by trying to              
deflect chain-of-command responsibility. They blamed the shocking 
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abuses on “bad apples.” As a result of political pressure for                      
information about the government’s secret interrogation and                             
detention policies, the first batch of “torture memos” were                        
declassified or leaked in June 2004. Those legal memoranda and policy 
directives were even more shocking than the photos because they         
revealed official authorization at the highest levels for torture and   
inhumane treatment, including forced nudity, use of military dogs, 
hooding, stress positions and sexual humiliations (see Cole 2009; 
Jaffer and Singh 2007).  
As a result of the flow of information about US torture into 
the public domain, the Bush administration’s denial strategies (see 
Cohen 2001) subsequently shifted from “literal denial”—we don’t 
torture, to “euphemistic denial”—what we do is not “torture.”                
Official denials were fortified by the refusal to authorize a thorough 
top-down investigation of the government’s interrogation and                 
detention policies, the portrayal of critics as “terrorist sympathizers,” 
and a novelly expansive use of the state secrets doctrine to smother 
accountability-seeking litigation brought by victims in US courts.  
Wikileaks, which was established in 2007, was characterized 
by the US Army Counterintelligence Center as an enemy organization 
in 2008. In a secret report (that Wikileaks got hold of and published), 
one of the examples of the danger that Wikileaks posed was the                  
posting of a leaked Standard Operating Procedure manual for               
Guantánamo which, according to the secret report, became the 
“subject of a lawsuit by international human rights groups and a             
domestic civil rights organization requesting the release of the                  
document under the US Freedom of Information Act.” 
When Barack Obama assumed the presidency in January 
2009, he cancelled the worst forms of prisoner abuse and shuttered 
the CIA’s black sites. But like his predecessor, he rebuffed calls for a 
thorough investigation of the US torture policy and refused to pursue 
the prosecution of its intellectual authors, contending that they had 
acted “in good faith.” The way in which his administration has been 
able to enforce the “looking forward, not backward” agenda is by      
preventing people from seeing evidence of past wrongdoing.                       
Government classification and redaction are currently at levels           
unprecedented in US history, and the Obama administration has    
prosecuted more federal employee whistleblowers than under all        
9
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previous US presidents combined (Greene 2011).  
In this environment of enforced unaccountability, leakage in 
general and the materials allegedly provided by Manning in particular 
pose a danger—the danger of credible information—that threatens 
the political quiescence on which this unaccountability depends. Some 
of the illegal policies authorized by officials, like warrantless spying 
and racial profiling entrapment of citizens and residents, which               
became public knowledge as a result of leaks, are entirely domestic 
matters (i.e., not international crimes) for which there is no alternative 
route to accountability. However, others arising from the conduct of 
war that involve grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are                
international offenses and therefore are potentially subject to                  
prosecution abroad. 
In the remainder of this article, I address three issues: First, a 
summary of efforts to hold US officials accused of torture-related  
offenses accountable in European courts; second, an examination of 
several diplomatic cables that expose the lengths to which both the 
Bush and Obama administrations have gone to derail these foreign 
criminal investigations into US torture and kidnapping, which                   
constitutes another dimension of enforced unaccountability; and third, 
the unexpected consequences that Wikileaked cables played in                 
catalyzing revolutionary uprisings across the Arab world. 
 
EFFORTS TO PURSUE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR US                    
TORTURE IN EUROPE 
 A variety of efforts have been mounted in European                  
countries to investigate aspects of the US interrogation and detention 
policy and, in some countries, to criminally indict officials responsible 
for torture and other offenses against prisoners (see Gallagher 2009; 
Hajjar 2010; Hendricks 2010; Kaleck 2009; Ratner 2008). Here is a 
partial list:  
 
 In 2004, a criminal complaint was introduced in Germany against 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and a number of other 
civilian and military officials on behalf of Iraqi victims of torture 
at Abu Ghraib. The case was brought in Germany for two                   
reasons: the country has one of the most robust laws in the books 
for prosecuting international crimes, and the US maintains a large 
10
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military presence in the country. Under intense US diplomatic 
pressure, the German prosecutor dismissed the case on the                 
principle of subsidiarity (i.e., that a foreign court cannot assert 
jurisdiction for a case that is being pursued in a more appropriate 
venue), despite the fact that there was no criminal investigation of 
Rumsfeld or the others named in the complaint in the US at the 
time. 
 
 In 2006, a second case was brought in Germany against Rumsfeld 
and several Bush administration lawyers accused of being the  
architects of the torture policy. The 2006 criminal complaint                  
contained substantial new information about Rumsfeld’s role in 
the torture of prisoners at Guantánamo, and pointed out that      
subsidiarity would not be an issue because there was no domestic 
investigation of the accused. In 2007, the prosecutor dismissed 
the case because none of those named in the complaint was            
present in the country and therefore a conviction would be              
unlikely.  
 
 Following a November 2005 exposé by the Washington Post that 
the CIA engaged in kidnappings and ran black sites in Europe 
(subsequently revealed by Human Rights Watch to be in Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania), the Council of Europe conducted an 
investigation and in 2006 reported that a hundred people had 
been kidnapped on the continent. The European Parliament’s 
investigative report, released in February 2007 and endorsed by a 
large majority, exposed extensive collusion by European security 
services and other government agencies with the CIA’s                            
extraordinary rendition program. In January 2011, a Polish                 
prosecutor conducting a criminal investigation into the CIA black 
site in that country recognized that Abu Zubaydah (the first “high 
value detainee” taken into CIA custody in 2002) was a victim of 
torture. That criminal investigation is ongoing. 
 
 In 2005, an Italian court issued indictments for twenty-six CIA 
agents (along with four Italian intelligence agents) who kidnapped 
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (aka Abu Omar) in Milan in                        
February 2003 and transported him to Egypt where he was               
11
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brutally tortured. The CIA mission actually disrupted an Italian 
criminal investigation of Abu Omar. Despite US diplomatic              
pressure and refusal to cooperate, and political opposition by the 
Berlusconi government, the agents’ trial-in-absentia proceeded. In 
November 2009, the Italian court handed down guilty verdicts for 
most of them. The heaviest sentence, eight years, went to the      
former head of the CIA’s Milan station, Robert Seldon Lady, 
while twenty-one others got five years. Several higher ranking 
CIA officials, including former Rome station chief Jeffrey Castelli, 
were neither convicted nor acquitted because the judge ruled that 
their defense was stymied by the unavailability (i.e., secrecy) of 
information about their roles in the kidnapping and rendition. 
Although the Italian government refused to request the                         
extradition of the convicted agents, the arrest warrants are active. 
The convicted would be at risk if they ever travel to a country 
with an extradition treaty with Italy, which includes all of Europe. 
 
 On October 26, 2007, after Rumsfeld was out of office, efforts 
were made to indict him while he was in Paris. His movement was 
being tracked by non-governmental organizations and a criminal 
complaint had been prepared. When Rumsfeld learned of the 
complaint, he fled through a side door of the building where he 
was giving a speech to avoid lawyers and reporters waiting for 
him outside. The complaint was dismissed by the Parisian                    
prosecutor in 2008 on the erroneous legal reasoning that officials 
have immunity for activities connected to their work; there is no 
legal immunity for torture. 
 
 The British government was implicated in the torture of Binyam 
Mohamed, a British resident who was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 
and extraordinarily rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan, then to 
Morocco where he was held for 18 months and brutally tortured. 
From Morocco he was transferred to a CIA black site near Kabul, 
and then to Guantánamo in 2004. The Bush administration,             
responding to British requests to release and repatriate Mohamed 
(against whom there were no credible charges), offered to do so 
on condition that he would remain silent about his treatment, 
which he refused. He was finally released and returned to Britain 
12
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in March 2009. The public disclosures about his treatment 
sparked intense political controversy and led to the first criminal 
investigation against British intelligence agents for their collusion 
in CIA torture. The Obama administration threatened to suspend 
bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation with Britain if documents 
detailing Mohamed's extraordinary rendition and torture were 
entered into evidence as part of his suit against British officials. 
That effort failed: In February 2010, the High Court rejected the 
Labour government's appeal to keep segments of the documents 
classified and they were published. On November 16, 2010, the 
British government announced that it was paying Mohamed and 
five other former Guantánamo detainees millions of pounds in 
compensation. 
 
 In November 2010, former President George W. Bush published 
his memoir, Decision Points. In it and in subsequent media                  
interviews, he acknowledged (not for the first time) that he had 
authorized waterboarding and other so-called “enhanced”               
interrogation tactics that are universally regarded, at least beyond 
US shores, as torture. In February 2011, Bush canceled his plans 
to travel to Switzerland to speak at a gala benefit because a                
criminal complaint had been filed against him in Geneva. 
 
 In 2007, a German court issued arrest warrants for thirteen CIA 
agents involved in the January 2004 kidnapping of Khaled El-
Masri, a German citizen, from Macedonia. El-Masri was                   
transported to Afghanistan where he was held incommunicado 
for months at the Salt Pit, a CIA black site near Kabul. When the 
CIA agents interrogating him realized that the arrest was a case of 
mistaken identity, officials up the chain-of-command ordered his 
release. He was dumped in a remote area of Albania and                    
eventually was able to return to Germany. The El-Masri case is 
discussed in further detail in the next section because it is the  
subject of a leaked diplomatic cable. 
 
 In May 2010, Spanish prosecutors issued indictments for the same 
thirteen CIA agents who had kidnapped El-Masri because they 
had transited through Spain. Another case in Spain involves               
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efforts to criminally investigate six Bush administration lawyers 
for their role in devising the torture policy and, therefore, in               
abetting the torture of Spanish nationals and residents detained at 
Guantánamo. These cases also are discussed further below          
because they are the subject of three leaked diplomatic cables. 
 
LEAKING THE POLITICS OF UNACCOUNTABILITY IN 
GERMANY 
 The Wikileaks cache of secret diplomatic cables include             
several pertaining to efforts to deter both the German and Spanish 
governments from pursuing criminal cases against US officials and 
agents. They illuminate and prove the lengths to which the US                 
government under both the Bush and Obama administrations has 
gone to obstruct any legal accountability for the crime of torture             
perpetrated by Americans. 
One cable dated February 6, 2007, from the US Embassy in 
Berlin has a subject line that reads : AL-MASRI [sic] CASE --      
CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS. “USG” is the 
acronym for US government. “CONCERNS” refers to the anxiety 
among officials, including Condoleeza Rice who was the National   
Security Advisor during El-Masri’s kidnapping and extraordinary               
rendition and Secretary of State when the cable was written. The 
“concern” referenced in that subject line was that Germany would 
actually enforce its own criminal laws and issue indictments.  
The findings of the German investigation into El-Masri’s  
ordeal were publicized in that country and nurtured support for               
prosecution from across the political spectrum. El-Masri had been 
kidnapped in a snatch-and-grab operation on January 23, 2004. He 
was beaten, stripped naked, given an enema tranquilizer (all standard 
operating procedures for extraordinary renditions), and put on a ghost 
plane for Afghanistan. At the Salt Pit, he was deprived of food and 
drinkable water and, by his account, was sodomized. In February, CIA 
agents interrogating him decided that his German passport might be 
genuine, meaning that they recognized that the person they had                 
kidnapped and were torturing was not who they thought he was—a 
suspected al-Qaeda member with a similar name. The passport was 
sent to Langley for confirmation of its authenticity. By March, CIA 
headquarters concluded that it was indeed genuine. But rather than 
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releasing and repatriating El-Masri, the CIA continued to detain him.  
In April 2004, CIA director George Tenet was informed that 
a German citizen was in the Salt Pit, but he did not order El-Masri’s 
release. In May, five months after the kidnapping, Rice ordered his 
release. But the CIA was befuddled about how to do so without          
creating an international incident and exposing their secret, illegal   
operations. Only following a second order from Rice was he 
“released.” But rather than being flown to Germany where his                
treatment would have to be publicly acknowledged, El-Masri was 
flown to Albania and dumped without money or papers on a remote 
road. The Albanian police who intercepted him eventually believed 
that he was German and allowed him to return home. The German 
investigators took note of a statement that Rice had given to the 
Washington Post that it was she who ordered El-Masri’s release. That 
statement directly implicated her in the crime. 
El-Masri’s detention in CIA custody had an added element 
that compounded the political scandal in Germany: He had been               
subjected to human experimentation, shot up with psychoactive drugs 
repeatedly over the six months of his custody. This was proven 
through hair, nail and skin samples (Horton 2010).  
After a criminal investigation was initiated, Secretary of State 
Rice and the NSA legal counsel, John Bellinger, mounted a                       
clandestine campaign to derail the process, warning the German             
government of adverse repercussions if they allowed the case to              
proceed. That warning and the responses it elicited is the topic of the 
Wikileaked secret cable authored by Deputy Chief of Mission John M. 
Koenig. He conveyed to the State Department that in meetings with 
German officials he had emphasized that the issuance of international 
arrest warrants for high-ranking US officials would have a negative 
impact on the bilateral relationship. He reminded German Deputy 
National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel of what had happened to US-
Italian relations in the wake of a similar move by Italian prosecutors 
the previous year. Koening claimed that “our intention was not to 
threaten Germany,” but by noting that the German federal                       
government had the power to stop the judicial process, the political 
arm-twisting was explicit and documented. 
In the cable, Koening conveyed to his bosses that Nikel had 
told him there was “intense pressure from the Bundestag and the    
15
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German media” to go forward with the case. Koening pointed out 
that the US government would likewise have a difficult time in                
managing domestic political implications if international arrest                 
warrants were issued. Nikel reiterated that he could not “promise that 
everything will turn out well.” The meaning of “well” here clearly 
meant the success of political collusion to thwart legal accountability 
for the grave abuse of a German citizen.  
The German case against top US officials died as a result of 
that political interference. But the case against the CIA agents who 
kidnapped El-Masri remained alive, if stalled. Although the German 
government refused to seek their extradition, the arrest warrants               
remain valid. One of those CIA agents was designated to be sent to a 
new assignment in the United Kingdom, but the British government 
warned against that because of the German warrant. 
The El-Masri case was also featured in a leaked cable from 
the US Embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, dated February 2, 2006. That 
lengthy cable discusses a range of issues including, ironically, criticisms 
of Macedonia’s underdeveloped commitment to the rule of law.                 
Macedonia was the country where El-Masri’s travails began with the 
collusion of local security agents. The cable notes that there has been 
“intense press commentary here, most of it negative,” and that 
“opposition parties and opinion-shapers accuse the government of 
jeopardizing Macedonia’s [European Union] accession chances by 
refusing to comprehensively answer Council of Europe and European 
Parliament requests for a full accounting in the case.” The cable                
reveals that the Macedonian government is caught between a US rock 
and an EU-accession/public opinion hard place; it favorably notes 
that the government has provided “careful” responses to requests for 
information, such as statements that they “have little information to 
provide on el-Masri [sic] and his allegations.” El-Masri has brought a 
case against Macedonia in the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
PINOCHET’S SHADOW 
Whereas the diplomatic pressure against Germany occurred 
during the Bush years, similar pressure on the Spanish government 
transpired under the Obama administration. One investigation                
emanated from a US military assault on April 8, 2003, on a Baghdad 
hotel housing journalists that killed two, one of whom was a Spanish 
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cameraman for Telecinco, José Couso; three US service members 
were named in a lawsuit brought by Couso’s family. A second case 
targets the CIA agents who kidnapped El-Masri because they transited 
through Spain using forged documents. The most politically volatile 
Spanish case targets six Bush administration lawyers accused of             
colluding in the intellectual authorship of the US torture policy. The 
“Bush Six” are former White House counsel and Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales, David Addington who was Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s counsel and then chief of staff, Pentagon General Counsel 
William J. Haynes, Undersecretary of Defense Policy Douglas Feith, 
Jay Bybee who was head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and 
OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo.  
Some of the details in the Bush Six case link up to larger            
developments in international criminal accountability since the 1990s 
(see Robertson 1998; Roht-Arriaza 2001). One of the Spanish                    
investigating judges was Baltasar Garzón who played a pioneering role 
in developing and deploying the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to 
pursue people accused of gross crimes. In 1998, when former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet traveled to Britain, Garzón issued a                
warrant for his arrest and an extradition to Spain to stand trial (see 
Dorfman 2002; Roht-Arriaza 2005). The British Law Lords weighed 
the various allegations against Pinochet; these included torture and 
genocide. The latter was connected to rampant extra-judicial                       
executions of people suspected of being leftist subversives by the   
Pinochet regime. The effort to frame such killings as genocide evinced 
Garzón’s effort to broaden the definition of that crime to include the 
systematic murder of political enemies. Under the Genocide                      
Convention of 1948, the crime is defined as “acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or    
religious group, as such.” Political groups were purposefully excluded 
from the definition during in the drafting phase.  
The Law Lords rejected Garzón’s attempted innovation to 
expand the definition of genocide. They contended, moreover, that 
these allegations of murder are not extraditable offenses because they 
occurred in the context of war—the “war on communism” raging 
through the Southern Cone (with US support) in the 1970s. They 
maintained that killing enemies is a legitimate function of a state in 
war. Therefore, Pinochet enjoyed sovereign immunity from foreign 
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prosecution for deaths that occurred during this war.  
However, in a landmark decision, they determined that               
torture is an extraditable offense for which there is no sovereign             
immunity because the torture of prisoners is not a legitimate function 
of any state. The “Pinochet precedent” held that even a former head 
of state could be extradited and prosecuted for torture under the            
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Pinochet managed to elude that fate 
when British Home Secretary Jack Straw made a political decision to 
allow him to return to Chile on the grounds that he was too frail to 
withstand trial abroad. US officials had been actively working to              
persuade the British government to do just that.  
Nevertheless, the Pinochet precedent inspired a variety of 
governments, mainly in Europe, to revise their national laws to permit 
the prosecution of accused foreign perpetrators of gross crimes in 
their national legal systems. Subsequent efforts to use those new or 
expanded universal jurisdiction laws led to heavy political and                   
diplomatic backlashes from countries—notably the US and Israel—
whose civilian and military officials were targeted for war crimes  
prosecutions, and some countries, like Belgium and Britain,                    
succumbed to foreign pressure and modified their laws to bar future 
cases brought by victims against officials from friendly and powerful 
nations. Most universal jurisdiction cases in Europe that have gone to 
trial have involved people from Africa and the Balkans.  
In Spain, Garzón was an aggressive pursuer of all kinds of 
gross crimes perpetrated by states and non-state groups. He used his 
judicial power to open investigations into crimes alleged to have             
occurred in a variety of countries, including against Israeli officials 
accused of war crimes during the second intifada and the war on Gaza 
in 2008-09, as well as American officials in the context of the “war on 
terror.” It was Israeli rather than American political-diplomatic                   
pressure that led to the 2009 narrowing of the Spanish universal                 
jurisdiction law. However, that law reform was not retroactive, so it 
did not close down the investigation of the Bush Six.  
 
FIGHTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN SPAIN 
 The case against the Bush Six is actually two cases. One,              
assigned to Judge Eloy Velasco Nuňez, arose from a complaint by a 
Spanish human rights organization, the Association for the Dignity of 
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Spanish Prisoners, on behalf of nationals and residents who were  
subjected to torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment at 
Guantánamo. The other, for which Garzón was the investigating 
judge, arose from the overturning of criminal convictions of four   
former Guantánamo detainees by the Spanish Supreme Court because 
the prosecution used evidence elicited through illegal interrogation 
methods and was therefore inadmissible. The Supreme Court ordered 
a more detailed investigation into their claims of torture.  
Three Wikileaked cables from the US Embassy in Madrid, 
dated April 1, April 17 and May 5, 2009, reveal the Obama                        
administration’s efforts to thwart these investigations, and the                    
willingness of Spanish political officials to collude in that effort. The 
April 1 cable’s subject line reads SPAIN: PROSECUTOR WEIGHS 
GTMO CRIMINAL CASE VS. FORMER USG OFFICIALS. The 
summary states that the Spanish organization that filed the complaint 
“is attempting to have the case heard by Investigating Judge Baltasar 
Garzón, internationally known for his dogged pursuit of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ cases.” Garzón had passed the file on the Bush Six to 
Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza to determine if there is a legitimate 
case. According to the cable, Zaragoza “told us that in all likelihood 
he would have no option but to open a case.” At the time of the 
meeting with Zaragoza, the cable states, “the evidence was on his desk 
in four red folders a foot tall.” 
Zaragoza is described as appearing “visibly displeased” to 
have to deal with this matter and assured US officials that he would 
argue against the case being assigned to Garzón. Although Garzón 
had “first right of refusal,” Zaragoza would try to get the case                   
assigned to Judge Ismael Moreno instead, because he is investigating 
the “illegal ‘CIA flights’ that have transited Spain carrying detainees to 
Guantánamo.” Zaragoza reportedly added that “Garzón’s impartiality 
was very suspect, given his public criticism of Guantánamo and the 
U.S. war on terror…and his August 2008 public statements that                
former President Bush should be tried for war crimes.” The one sure 
way that Spain could dismiss the Bush Six case, according to                       
Zaragoza, would be for the US to open its own credible investigation 
of the accused.  
The final paragraph in the April 1 cable, titled “Comment,” 
articulates official accountability anxiety quite clearly: “The fact that 
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this complaint targets former Administration legal officials may reflect 
a ‘stepping-stone’ strategy designed to pave the way for complaints 
against even more senior officials.” The cable conveys suspicion 
(accurate) that American lawyers and organizations like Human Rights 
Watch and Reprieve (UK) may have been involved because the               
complaint “appears to have been drafted by someone who                       
understands the U.S. legal system far better than the average Spanish 
lawyer.” And finally, “the timing could not be worse for President 
Zapatero as he tries to improve ties with the U.S. and get the Spanish 
public focused on the future of the relationship rather than the past. 
That said, we do not know if the government would be willing to take 
the risky step of trying behind the scenes to influence the prosecutor’s 
recommendation on this case or what their reaction to such a request 
would be.” 
Over the following two weeks, according to the April 17             
cable, a concerted campaign of INTENSIVE USG OUTREACH was 
waged. The Obama administration sent Senators Mel Martinez (R-FL) 
and Judd Gregg (R-NH) to lobby Spanish officials to dispose of this 
case. Martinez’s mission, according to the cable, was to underscore 
“that the prosecutions would not be understood or accepted in the US 
and would have an enormous impact on the bilateral relationship.” 
The outcome of this campaign appeared tentatively successful, as   
expressed in the cable’s subject line: SPAIN: ATTORNEY                    
GENERAL RECOMMENDS COURT NOT PURSUE GTMO 
CRIMINAL CASE VS. FORMER USG OFFICIALS.  
On April 16, Spanish Attorney General Candido Conde        
Pumpido had announced that he would not support this criminal 
complaint because it is “’fraudulent,’ and has been filed as a political 
statement to attack past USG policies.” According to the cable, his 
legal reasoning was that a complaint targeting US “advisers” could not 
be pursued in light of the fact that an earlier Spanish case 
(unexplained in the cable) against Rumsfeld “had failed.” Like                     
Zaragoza’s comments documented in the previous cable, Conde     
Pumpido said that “if there is evidence of criminal activity by USG 
officials, then a case should be filed in the United States.” But, the 
cable notes, he said that it would still be up to investigating judge 
Garzón whether to pursue the case or not and that governmental  
opposition alone could not derail it.  
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The following day (April 17), Garzón bowed to the                 
arguments of Spanish prosecutors to have the case reassigned and he 
forwarded it to National Court docketing authorities, who turned it 
over to Judge Velasco. Although unmentioned in the cable, on May 4, 
Velasco submitted an International Rogatory Letter to US Attorney 
General Eric Holder asking for confirmation about “whether the facts 
to which the complaint makes reference are or not now being                       
investigated or prosecuted.”  
On April 29, Garzón announced that he was opening a new 
investigation into alleged US torture at Guantánamo, although he did 
not name any individual targets. The embarrassment and exclusion of 
Garzón was the busywork of Spanish and American officials over the 
following three weeks, according to the cable dated May 5. Embassy 
officials met with Zaragoza on May 4 to discuss Garzón’s latest move. 
Zaragoza said he had “directly and personally” asked Garzón if he had 
announced a new investigation “to drum up more speaking fees…
Zaragoza opined that Garzón, having gotten his headline, would soon 
drop the matter.” From there, the cable proceeds to describe                       
Zaragoza’s “strategy to force [Garzón’s] hand” if he does not drop the 
case. Paradoxically, Zaragoza’s strategy aimed to use one                           
accountability-seeking case in Spain to derail Garzón’s new                       
investigation: It hinged on the fact that Garzón had ordered Spanish 
police to visit Spanish detainees at Guantánamo in 2004. Zaragoza 
reasoned that Garzón could be embarrassed into dropping the case 
because he had appeared to condone the means by which the                   
evidence had been gathered that Spain subsequently used to prosecute 
four former Guantánamo detainees, whose conviction was overturned 
by the Supreme Court.  
Zaragoza elaborated on his hand-forcing strategy: The police 
officers Garzón had sent to Guantánamo were scheduled to testify 
before Judge Moreno on the CIA flight case, and “Zaragoza hopes 
their testimony will put on record Garzón’s role in the earlier cases.” 
More ominously and, as it has turned out, presciently, Zaragoza was 
also “banking on the fact that Garzón is already in hot water over his 
excessive zeal in another case.” What he was referring to was the fact 
that Garzón had garnered the wrath of Spanish fascists by opening an 
investigation into Franco-era crimes when he ordered the exhumation 
of nineteen mass graves in 2008. For disregarding the country’s                
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amnesty law that had closed the book on crimes of that era (despite 
that he was not seeking criminal indictments), he was accused of              
exceeding his judicial authority and was suspended. In September 
2010, the Supreme Court endorsed a lower court’s ruling that Garzón 
should be tried.  
The May 5 cable concludes with a summing up of where the 
Bush Six case stood at the time. It notes that Zaragoza  
 
is acting in good faith and playing a                        
constructive role…Nevertheless, we do not share his 
optimism that this problem will go away anytime 
soon. Having started, it is hard for us to see why the 
publicity-loving Garzón would shut off his headline-
generating machine unless forced to do so… We also 
fear Garzón -- far from being deterred by threats of 
disciplinary action -- may welcome the chance for 
martyrdom, knowing the case will attract worldwide 
attention. In any event, we will probably be dealing 
with this issue for some time to come. 
 
These three cables were published in El Pais on November 
29, 2010, the day after they were released by Wikileaks. They                       
immediately elicited an outcry in Spain over their officials’ collusion 
with US officials to thwart criminal investigations (see Democracy 
Now 2010). On December 14, the New York City-based Center for 
Constitutional Rights and the Berlin-based European Center for         
Human Rights (2010), which had been assisting the Spanish lawyers 
who made the complaint, submitted an expert opinion to the Spanish 
National Court advising of additional information about the US            
torture program that had come to light and, referencing the cables 
themselves, efforts by the US to interfere politically with the Spanish 
legal process. The following day Velasco issued an order to the                 
prosecution asking for its views on whether the case should proceed 
or by which date the US should respond to the still-unanswered                    
questions in the Letter Rogatory.  
 
AMERICA’S UNACCOUNTABLE RESPONSE 
 The Wikileaked cables about secretive diplomatic                          
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interventions in the Spanish legal process contributed both directly 
and indirectly to public knowledge about the status of torture               
accountability in the US. On January 28, 2011, Velasco issued an order 
that set March 1 as the deadline for the US response to his questions. 
On exactly that date the US Justice Department sent a letter authored 
by Mary Ellen Warlow in the Criminal Division’s Office of                           
International Affairs. Velasco subsequently issued a ruling in which he 
“temporarily stayed” the case in Spain.  
The Justice Department letter to Velasco is a succinct and 
disturbing summary of how the US government has dealt with                     
well-substantiated evidence of the systematic and pervasive torture of 
prisoners in the “war on terror.” The letter claims that the 
“government of the United States, in various fora, has undertaken 
numerous actions relating both to 1) the alleged mistreatment of                
detainees at issue in the [Spanish] complaint; and 2) legal advice                 
provided in relation to the detainees.” The letter then proceeds to  
describe these actions.  
In regard to the issue of legal advice, the letter explains that 
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
is the authority for investigating alleged misconduct by Justice              
Department lawyers. The letter states that OPR conducted an                    
investigation into the activities of Bybee and Yoo, who had authored 
some of the most significant memos relating to the interrogation of 
detainees, including two dated August 1, 2002, one of which narrowed 
the definition of physical torture to exclude anything less than “the 
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,               
impairment of bodily function, or even death,” and the second that 
sanctioned tactics, including waterboarding, already in use by the CIA. 
The blithe description of that investigation and its outcome                      
misrepresents the actual story, which is a sordid and politicized effort 
to enforce unaccountability.  
The OPR investigation was completed but not released under 
President Bush, and was withheld from the public (without                         
explanation) until February 2010 (see US Department of Justice 2009). 
When it was finally released, as astute observers had expected, the 
OPR report contained substantial evidence that OLC lawyers had     
colluded with the White House to “legalize” unlawful tactics. The  
authors of the draft OPR report concluded that this constituted 
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“professional misconduct,” which could have led to disbarment           
proceedings. In the case of Bybee, it could have led to his                            
impeachment from the bench of the Ninth Circuit where he currently 
sits. But instead of allowing that honest and accurate conclusion to be 
adopted in the final report, Attorney General Holder authorized                
David Margolis, a career Justice Department official, to make the final 
determination. Margolis decided that the lawyers whose work had 
been investigated had merely exercised “poor judgment.”  
According to the Justice Department letter responding to 
Velasco’s questions, in light of Margolis’s conclusion, “there exists no 
basis for criminal prosecution of Yoo or Bybee.” This conclusion was 
used by the government to also assert, as stated in the letter, that “the 
Department of Justice has concluded that it is not appropriate to 
bring criminal cases with respect to any other executive branch                
officials, including those named in the complaint [i.e., Gonzales,               
Addington, Feith, and Haynes], who acted in reliance on these and 
related OLC memoranda with respect to their involvement with the 
policies and procedures for detention and interrogation.”  
In regard to other allegations of detainee mistreatment and 
domestic accountability measures not specific to the Spanish                    
complaint, the letter cites two successful prosecutions in federal court 
(David Passaro, a CIA contractor convicted for brutally assaulting a 
detainee in Afghanistan in 2003, and Don Ayala, a private contractor 
in Afghanistan who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the 
death of a detainee whom “he and US soldiers had detained”). The 
letter then proclaims that the “breadth of investigative actions” “show 
that there are effective judicial processes under U.S. law for addressing 
violations.”  
As a matter of fact, aside from court martial proceedings or 
administrative sanctions against approximately 100 soldiers, the Justice 
Department never pursued any criminal “investigative actions”                 
involving those up the chain-of-command. Moreover, in every single 
civil lawsuit brought by victims of US torture against civilian or                   
military officials or private corporations, the government mobilized an 
expansive interpretation of the state secrets doctrine to shut them 
down. Not a single official was ever held civilly liable in a US court, 
and this was the direct result of the Justice Department’s successful 
efforts to persuade judges that such cases are non-justiciable.  
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The only area of criminal conduct that the Obama                  
administration authorized for investigation involved individual CIA 
agents who might have “exceeded” the legal advice provided by OLC 
lawyers. Mock execution was the one practice deemed to fall beyond 
the pale of that advice. Assistant US Attorney John Durham was 
tasked to investigate possible excesses as well as the CIA’s destruction 
of videotapes of several detainees (which recorded their                              
waterboarding and other forms of violent abuse). In November 2010, 
as the letter responding to Velasco states, Durham concluded that “it 
was not appropriate to bring criminal charges with regard to the actual 
destruction of the tapes.” The letter adds that Durham and his team’s 
investigation into whether federal laws were violated in connection 
with the interrogation of specific detainees is “ongoing, and its details 
remain confidential.” Since then, Durham decided that the CIA agents 
who exceeded the OLC guidelines should not be prosecuted (see                
Human Rights Watch 2011).  
 
UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 
 The regime of secrecy, deception and unaccountability for 
torture and other illegal actions by the US government was apparently 
a factor in Bradley Manning’s decision to leak the largest trove of     
classified materials in US history. On the diplomatic cables                          
specifically, Manning described their contents to Lamo as: 
 
c r a z y ,  a l m o s t  c r i m i n a l  p o l i t i c a l                                 
backdealings… the non-PR-versions of world events 
and crises… its important that it gets out… i feel, for 
some bizarre reason… it might actually change        
something… 
 
Manning will probably be convicted and face life in prison. 
But the leakage for which he stands accused changed more than a 
mere “something.” A leaked diplomatic cable from the Tunisian                
Embassy was one catalyst in the December 2010 revolution in that 
country that led, over a matter of days, to the end of the corrupt and 
authoritarian regime of Zine Ben Ali. The Tunisian revolution sparked 
the Egyptian revolution that started in earnest on January 25, 2011. 
And the inspiration of sustained protests demanding the end of the 
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regime of Hosni Mubarak set off the revolutionary events across the 
region that have been described as the “Arab Spring.”  
In a last ditch effort to hang onto power in the face of                
massive, countrywide unrest, on January 29 Mubarak named Omar 
Suleiman, head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service (GIS), to fill 
the long-vacant vice presidency. Suleiman’s promotion had been              
predicted in a leaked cable with the title “Presidential Succession in 
Egypt” dated May 14, 2007. Appointing Suleiman was a shrewd (but 
ultimately unsuccessful) move because he was a favorite of                   
Washington, and Mubarak clearly hoped that this would motivate the 
US to back his regime against revolutionary demands for his                       
departure.  
In the mid-1990s, Suleiman worked closely with the Clinton 
administration in devising and implementing the rendition program. 
Back then, rendition involved kidnapping suspected terrorists and 
transferring them to their home or a third country for trial. In The 
Dark Side, Jane Mayer (2008: 113) describes how the rendition                  
program began during the Clinton years:  
 
Each rendition was authorized at the very top levels 
of both governments [the US and Egypt]....The long-
serving chief of the Egyptian central intelligence 
agency, Omar Suleiman, negotiated directly with top 
[CIA] officials. [Former US Ambassador to Egypt 
Edward] Walker described the Egyptian counterpart, 
Suleiman, as “very bright, very realistic,” adding that 
he was cognizant that there was a downside to “some 
of the negative things that the Egyptians engaged 
in, of torture and so on. But he was not squeamish, 
by the way.”  
 
Mayer adds:  
Technically, US law required the CIA to seek 
“assurances” from Egypt that rendered suspects 
wouldn't face torture. But under Suleiman's reign at 
the EGIS, such assurances were considered close to 
worthless. As Michael Scheuer, a former CIA officer 
[head of the al-Qaeda desk] who helped set up the 
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practice of rendition, later testified, even if such 
“assurances” were written in indelible ink, “they 
weren't worth a bucket of warm spit.” 
 
When renditions got “extraordinary” during the Bush            
administration, Egypt was a favorite destination to send detainees for 
torture-by-proxy. One person extraordinarily rendered there was 
Egyptian-born Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib. As Habib (2009) 
recounts in his memoir, My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn’t, he 
was repeatedly subjected to electric shocks, immersed in water up to 
his nostrils, beaten, had his fingers broken, and was hung from metal 
hooks. At one point, his interrogator slapped him so hard that his 
blindfold was dislodged, revealing the identity of his tormentor:                  
Suleiman. Frustrated that Habib was not providing useful information 
or confessing to involvement in terrorism, Suleiman ordered a guard 
to murder a shackled Turkistani prisoner in front of Habib, which he 
did with a vicious karate kick. In April 2002, after five months in 
Egypt, Habib was rendered to American custody at Bagram prison in 
Afghanistan, and then transported to Guantánamo. The day before he 
was scheduled to be charged by the military commissions, Dana Priest 
and Dan Eggen (2005) published a Washington Post exposé about 
Habib’s torture. The US government immediately announced that he 
would not be charged and repatriated him home to Australia. 
A far more infamous torture case in which Suleiman also is 
directly implicated is that of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, an alleged trainer at 
al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan. After he was captured by the                  
Pakistanis while fleeing across the border in November 2001, al-Libi 
was sent to Bagram, then to a CIA black site on the USS Bataan in the 
Arabian Sea, then extraordinarily rendered to Egypt. Al-Libi confessed 
knowledge about a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime 
of Saddam Hussein. In early 2003, this was exactly the kind of                    
information that the Bush administration was seeking to justify a          
“pre-emptive” attack on Iraq and to persuade reluctant allies to go 
along. Indeed, al-Libi’s “confession” was one the central pieces of 
“evidence” presented at the United Nations by Secretary of State 
Colin Powell to make the case for war. However, that confession was 
a lie tortured out of al-Libi by the Egyptians under Suleiman’s                   
supervision. CIA chief Tenet (2007: 353-354) provides his account of 
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the al-Libi situation in his memoir, At the Center of the Storm: 
 
We believed that al-Libi was withholding critical 
threat information at the time, so we                     
transferred him to a third country for further       
debriefing. Allegations were made that we did so 
knowing that he would be tortured, but this is false. 
The country in question [Egypt] understood and 
agreed that they would hold al-Libi for a limited          
period. In the course of questioning while he was in 
U.S. custody in Afghanistan, al-Libi made initial               
references to possible al-Qa'ida [sic] training in Iraq. 
Then, shortly after the Iraq war got under way, al-
Libi recanted his story. Now, suddenly, he was saying 
that there was no such cooperative training…He 
clearly lied. We just don't know when. Did he lie 
when he first said that al-Qa'ida [sic] members               
received training in Iraq or did he lie when he said 
they did not? In my mind, either case might still be 
true…The fact is, we don't know which story is true, 
and since we don't know, we can assume nothing.  
 
The use of al-Libi’s statement in the build up to the Iraq war 
and the subsequent revelation that he had recanted made him a huge 
potential liability for the US. Al-Libi’s whereabouts were unknown 
until April 2009 when HRW researchers doing an investigation about 
the treatment of prisoners in Libya encountered him in the courtyard 
of a prison in Tripoli. This prompted efforts by HRW to gain access 
to al-Libi in order to question him about his experience. Two weeks 
later, on May 10, al-Libi was dead, and the Qaddafi regime claimed it 
was a “suicide” (Hajjar 2011). According to Evan Kohlmann (2009), 
“Al-Libi’s death coincided with the first visit by Egypt’s spymaster 
Omar Suleiman to Tripoli…By the time Omar Suleiman’s plane left 
Tripoli, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi had committed ‘suicide.’” 
Several days after Suleiman was appointed vice president, the 
Mubarak regime collapsed and was replaced by a military junta                   
operating under the title of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). On September 8, 2011, after the dictatorial Libyan regime of 
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Muammar al-Qaddafi had been routed from the capital city as a result 
of the NATO-assisted revolution in that country, investigators started 
combing the files in the office of the country’s security chief Moussa 
Koussa. They found numerous cables from the CIA and Britain’s MI6 
detailing Libya’s cooperative role in the extraordinary rendition                  
program.  
After Mubarak fell, Egyptian protesters expressed their                
loathing of the torture and police abuse that had been mainstays of 
the regime for so long. Jails and prisons across the country were             
attacked, in some places still containing the devices of torture. When 
protesters seized the offices of the GIS, the Ministry of Interior and 
other security centers, they found tons of recently shredded                         
documents presumably including information about Egypt’s role in 
the US torture program. The reason for this presumption is that the 
shredded tonnage did not include vast amounts of domestic police 
files on Egyptians who had been imprisoned. Anti-torture activists 
have speculated that in those hours as the regime collapsed, the CIA 
urged counterparts in Egypt to destroy evidence that may be used for 
future accountability-seeking initiatives in Egypt and elsewhere.                 
However, human rights lawyers had plans to pursue the prosecution 
of Suleiman, including for his role in assisting US torture using                 
evidence contained in documents found in Libya as well as ones in 
Egypt that escaped the shredder. Suleiman avoided that prospect by 
dying 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The rampancy and details of US torture became known to 
Americans and the world against the will of government officials who 
strived keep this information hidden. Because torture is a crime, the 
lengths to which the government has gone to keep still-undisclosed 
information secret, and to resist accountability at home and abroad is 
an ongoing criminal enterprise. As the leaked diplomatic cables                     
indicate, public opinion in Europe has been broadly supportive of 
criminal accountability for US torturers, even though—or in the case 
of Spain, because—criminal complaints have been killed or suspended 
through back channel tampering. While, at present, enforced                 
unaccountability has prevailed to keep US officials out of the docks of 
foreign courts, new revelations about the torture program continue to 
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come to light, including recently uncovered communiqués between 
the CIA and now-deposed Arab dictators. The future consequences 
and uses of that information may not be so easily managed through 
government-to-government political arm twisting. 
There is no legal immunity or any statute of limitations for 
the gross crime of torture. Recent developments in Latin America are 
suggestive of the possibility of future accountability. Many of the               
region’s military regimes that had perpetrated mass torture (as well as 
extra-judicial executions) granted themselves immunity as they vacated 
power. Their impunity was supported or accepted at the time by large 
sectors of those societies who wanted to “look forward, not                     
backward.” But the passage of time and changing political                           
environments brought forth a legal reckoning as some of those aging 
torturers were put on trial and convicted (see Lutz and Reiger 2009). 
However belated, these prosecutions have served to transform the 
conditions in which impunity previously had thrived and have added 
new and redeeming chapters to those nations’ histories. The record of 
authoritarian-era struggles by lawyers and human rights activists that 
bore little fruit at the time became a critical factor in recent quests for 
justice and accountability.  
The history of this era is defined both by torture and by 
transnational efforts to stop and punish it. Ultimately, even failed          
attempts to pursue accountability for those responsible for US torture 
leave a noble record of efforts to enforce the law and validate the 
norms and rules that were so flagrantly violated. These initiatives will 
be important in the future, perhaps even more than at present, as a 
record of resistance to inhumanity and dehumanization. Moreover, as 
any good student of “law in action” knows, the impact of legal                      
initiatives cannot be assessed definitively by the immediate outcomes 
of cases.  
These efforts to hold US officials accountable are better           
understood because of the leaked cables that reveal the lengths to 
which the government has gone to thwart them. Or, to put it another 
way, were it not for the leakage, we would know far less about the 
disgraceful record of enforced unaccountability. It is not be hard to 
predict who, in the future, will be remembered for being on the right 
side of history. 
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